WebPhenomenal Consciousness: The Explantory Gap 709 phenomenal states.4 This temptation is one that a physicalist (or function-alist) should resist, however, even though it is certainly true that we do often conceive of our phenomenal states in a manner that brings to bear indexicals as well as phenomenal concepts. WebAbstract. Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, there are many possible reactions. Some deny that any explanatory gap …
Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap
WebPenultimate Draft. Final version forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology 6 Regarding the explanation of Mary’s new knowledge, the PCS claims that (most) phenomenal concepts are perspectival, that is, in order to possess a phenomenal concept, we need to have had the corresponding experience.4 In this way, we can explain why Mary gains new knowledge … WebPhenomenal concepts, like proper names, refer directly, and for this reason mind‐brain identities similarly raise no explanatory question. Let us suppose, for the sake of the argument, that we find out that pain is the firing of nociceptive‐specific neurons in … see my xfinity plan
Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge - Paperback
WebPhenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap. David Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. Why we should lower our expectations about the explanatory gap. Neil Campbell - 2009 - Theoria 75 (1):34-51. WebThe explanatory gap problem and Papineau’s phenomenal concepts strategy January 2024 DOI: Authors: Sanela Ristić Ranković Abstract The main purpose of this article is to … WebSep 1, 2024 · While the phenomenal concept strategy is arguably the only response to the explanatory gap that has the potential to be consistent with the science of consciousness, many of its advocates argue that phenomenal concepts may be too opaque to support a legitimate science of consciousness. 8 Philosopher and cognitive scientist Peter … seen acronym